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Abstract 
Rapid environmental changes can affect agriculture by introducing additional sources of uncertainty. 
Conversely, policy interventions to help farmers cope with risks may have strong impacts on the 
environment. In this paper, we evaluate the effects of public risk management programmes, 
particularly subsidies on crop insurance, on fertilizer use and land allocation. We implement a 
mathematical programming model based on data collected from 1,092 farms in Puglia, a southern Italy 
region. The results show that under the current crop insurance programmes, input use is expected to 
increase, while the effect on production is likely to be crop-specific. The policy and environmental 
implications are discussed. 
Keywords: uncertainty; risk management; input use; multifunctionality. 
Introduction 
Agricultural production is a risky activity: factors beyond the manager’s control most often affect final 
outcomes. In particular agriculture is largely affected by weather fluctuations and climate change 
(Knox et al., 2010; Knox and Wade, 2012; Di Falco et al., 2014). As a result there has been increasing 
attention in planning public interventions aimed at reducing income variability. In the USA, Canada 
and vast majority of EU Member States, farmers and their representatives have paid particular 
attention to the potential offered by the involvement of governments in farm risk management 
programmes (Cafiero et al., 2007). This is to some extent, also true in less developed economies such 
as the Mediterranean countries (Santeramo et al., 2012; 2014).The environmental consequences of risk 
management policy, such as crop insurance, have been fiercely debated (Capitanio and Adinolfi, 2009; 
van Asseldonk et al., 2013; Dorling, 2014), but their role as determinants of insuring decisions is still 
unclear. Moreover, whether or not the purchase of crop insurance induces farmers to reduce the use of 
potentially polluting chemical inputs (intensive margin) or expanding the area of cultivated land 
(extensive margin)is an unresolved issue (Mishra et al., 2005; Enjolras et al., 2012). In fact, while 
chemical and fertilizer applications tend to influence yield and profit variance, crop insurance 
subsidies are usually provided to farmers located in risky areas in order to help risk-averse farmers 
tocope with risks and increase the cultivated area. Readers interested in this research area are referred 
to Babcock and Hennessy (1996), Smith and B. K. Goodwin (1996) and Moschini and Hennessy 
(2001). 
In this framework, the FischlerCAP reform of 2003 represented a systematic attempt to reorient farm 
policy to place greater emphasis on environmental, landscape, food quality and animal welfare 
objectives. There are five key new elements in the reworked CAP framework; (i) the introduction of 
decoupled payments, (ii) environmental cross compliance, (iii) re-orientation of CAP support towards 
rural development policy by modulation, (iv) an audit system and (v) new rural development 
measures. In this context, direct payments are conditional upon the respect of minimum 
environmental, animal welfare and food safety standards, and modulation of direct payments has been 
made compulsory, so that each Member State is forced to divert a (small) part of its direct payment 
endowments to the resources available for rural and regional development policies. The latest CAP 
reform acknowledged that increased mobility and leisure time, added to the relocation of population 
towards rural areas, have all acted to increase the marginal value of environmental amenity. 
A new role has been attributed to the primary sector, namely production of environmental goods and 
food quality and safety. This new role may be explained in terms of multifunctionality, which means 
that agro-environmental policies promote non-commodity outputs jointly produced with agricultural 
commodity outputs (Zheng and Liu, 2013). 
At the same time, the new regulations arising from the CAP Health Check of 2009 confer management 
autonomy on Member States for the first time, authorised to use up to 10% of the national maximum 
ceiling, to supply specific aid in clearly defined cases. Among specific subsidies (Measure (d) 
insurance), there is the possibility of using the first pillar for subsidising measures to cover the risk of 
economic losses caused by adverse weather conditions and by animal or plant diseases or parasitic 
infestation (Art.70, EC Regulation 73/2009). In fact, Measure (d) allows financial contributions to be 
granted for payment of crop insurance premiums up to a maximum of 65% of the total premium in the 
form of EU co-financing (a new concept in the history of the CAP). This co-financing cannot exceed 
75% of the national financial contribution.In summary, whilst both risk management and 
environmental policy have been specifically regulated, it remains unclear to date how such 
programmes might act together, without one offsetting the other. 
Hence the main objective of this investigation was to clarify the relationship between risk management 
policy and environmental policy in the context of farmers’ agrochemical applications and land use, 
expanding the analysis conducted by Capitanio et al. (2014). To our knowledge, these studies are 
unique in Europe, and the results may well bring about a review of government risk management 
programmes, which undoubtedly introduces potential distortion into farm-level decision-making 
which could be affected at both the intensive (input use) and extensive (land use) margins. There could 
be a knock-on effect in terms of rural and regional policy, which currently represents for southern 
Europe, i.e. Italy, the driving force of development.The paper first describes the Italian crop insurance 
system and the debate on risk management and environmental policies; then we present the theoretical 
and empirical frameworks; and finally we present the empirical results and concluding comments. 
Crop insurance in Italy 
In Italy, the government’s involvement in agricultural risk management is based on the wholly state-
financed National Solidarity Fund for natural disasters in agriculture (FSN), set up in 1974 with two 
main objectives: (i) to compensate farmers for damage due to natural disasters and (ii) to support the 
use of crop insurance. State contribution has constantly increased in nominal terms, although this is 
mostly due to the increased share of combined perils policies that benefit from higher public subsidy 
to premiums (80%). Tariffs show a significant reduction between 2007 and 2011 (Table 1). 
However, until recently, access to disaster payments was open to all farmers, irrespective of the 
signing of insurance contracts. From 1981 through to 2005, appropriations by the FSN have totalled 
about €9.4 billion; 72% of that being spent on disaster payments, while insurance subsidies have 
absorbed the remaining 28%. Over the same period, disaster payments averaged €234 million per 
annum, reaching a maximum €522 million in 1990 (Borriello, 2003). The Italian system of 
compensation for natural disaster damage is mainly reactive, in the sense that the initial annual 
endowment of funds received by the FSN can be integrated with ad hoc specific legislative measures, 
when necessary. In 2002, total appropriations for the FSN were €481 million. The law which 
established the FSN also authorized operation of farmers’ associations at the provincial level 
(Consorzi di Difesa) which were assigned two functions: (i) collection of farmers’ insurance demands 
(mainly for hail) and transferring them to the insurance companies; and (ii) the coordination and 
enforcement of common preventive measures. Despite subsidies of about 35% to 40% of actual 
premiums, the spread of insurance in Italian agriculture has been rather thin: the share of insured value 
on total crop production — mainly fruit crops and vineyards — has never exceeded 15%, attained in 
1998 but then decreasing in subsequent years. One likely reason is the possibility for Italian farmers to 
access compensation for natural disasters even without signing insurance policies. The Italian system 
has been modified in recent years by the Legislative Decree (29th March 2004)with more emphasis on 
crop insurance, in an attempt to reduce the cost of ex-post compensation in the event of disasters. The 
main changes are the possibility for farmers to underwrite newly designed contracts for innovative 
pluri-risk coverage directly with insurance companies, with premiums subsidised by up to 80%, and 
state-supported reinsurance. Eligibility for indemnity shall be determined by an income loss, taking 
into account only income from agriculture which exceeds 30% of average gross income or the 
equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the same or similar schemes). 
Moreover, the amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 % of the producer’s income 
loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to receive this assistance. 
Risk management and environmental policies 
There is extensive literature on the potential environmental impacts of government-sponsored risk 
management programmes such as subsidised crop insurance and crop disaster payments (Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg 1993, Smith and Goodwin 1996, Wu 1999, Seo, Mitchell and Leatham, 2005).All these 
studies are limited to the USA. Since North America has experienced a long history of crop insurance, 
large datasets allow economists to estimate crop insurance adoption patterns, chemical input use and 
crop acreage allocation. In contrast, in Europe such data are unavailable, explaining why farmers’ 
behaviour under uncertainty has been under-investigated.An underlying policy question is whether the 
benefits provided by government-subsidised risk management programmes are offset by the costs of 
such programs, including the costs of unintended environmental effects, and whether or not risk 
management programmes could offset environmental programmes, for example, as predicted by 
Fischler’s reform. 
Concerning the use of chemical input, early studies examined the impact of price uncertainty on a 
competitive, one-input, one-output firm (Sandmo, 1971; Ishii, 1977; Briys and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Hey, 
1985). Pope and Kramer (1979) modelled production risks by analyzing their effects on input use. 
They showed that, under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) assumption, risk-averse agents tend 
to use more inputs in order to decrease the impact of risky activities. Ashan et al. (1982) investigated 
the relationship between crop insurance and input usage. They investigate the relationship between 
crop insurance and input usage and showed that farmers adopting full coverage crop insurance are 
likely to choose the risk-neutrality optimal input solution. Quiggin (1992) introduced the moral hazard 
problem: he found that crop insurance may lead to a reduction in input use. 
One of the most cited contributions is the research by Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993). They showed 
that in many instances pesticides are more accurately viewed as risk-increasing. While the 
conventional wisdom is that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs, they found that their use may increase 
rather than decrease with crop insurance. Since Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s (1993) work was based on 
data prior to 1992, before the Reform Act came into force in the USA in 1994, some aspects of farmer 
behaviour may have changed. 
Smith and Goodwin (1996) criticized Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s (1993) findings that multiple peril 
crop insurance could force farmers to increase chemical input use. They emphasized the strong linkage 
between increase in expected yield and increase in yield variance, if an input is considered as risk-
increasing. The increase in variance positively affects the likelihood of an indemnity payment but the 
increase in mean yield offsets it. The net effect is ambiguous.Smith and Goodwin (1996) doubted that 
the expected indemnity payment increased with input use for two reasons. Firstly, chemical inputs 
increase production costs, and lower (increase) the expected profits (losses) when indemnity payments 
are made. Secondly, the critical yield that triggers an indemnity payment is determined by the farm’s 
yield history. 
Wu (1999) found that crop insurance for corn in Nebraska caused a shift in production from hay and 
pasture to corn. In other words, crop insurance subsidies may also promote environmental degradation 
due to the increase in production which may result in increases in overall chemical use for crops. 
Importantly, this shift involves considering environmental externalities at the extensive and intensive 
margin. Wu (1999) also pointed out that an increase in chemical application rates may be due to the 
‘moral hazard’ created by crop insurance. 
Choices under uncertainty: recalling the theory 
For our empirical investigation we used a non-linear programming model (NLP). Following Lambert 
and McCarl(1985) we developed a model for farmer decision-making to capturethe strategies when 
deciding to enrol in the Environmental Program (EP) under uncertainty.We considered whether their 
participation strategies could be offset by risk management programs, such as crop insurance.In order 
to analyze the effects of the introduction of a subsidy on the premium of all-risk insurance on yields, 
we used the Italian Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) dataset of two samples of farms located 
inPuglia, a region in Southern Italy.It is representative of the Italian agricultural system, and includes a 
variety of different farm types. We considered wheat and tomato producers in order to differentiate the 
sample in terms of expected variability of yields/revenue. Our analysis concerns two case studies of 
the same lowland/highland system. 
The choice of wheat and tomato is due to their different yield variability (tomato yields generally show 
higher variability than wheat) and to different production characteristics.The database is extracted 
from FADN-RICA and includes1,092 farms, observed over the period from 2003 to 2008. 
Theoretically, farmers’ enrolment decisions in the EP mean dealing with various sources of 
uncertainty. The decision to participate in the EP must be made in the face of the well-known revenue 
uncertainty of agricultural production resulting from variability in output prices and crop yields. For 
clarity, we consider two farmers who farm in different regions. For unsubsidized insurance one farmer 
would pay £10 per £100 of liability; the other £20 per £100 of liability for the same insurance policy. 
In relative risk terms, the farmer paying £20 would have yields that are twice as risky for the same 
insurance policy. Given a 50% subsidy, the lower risk farmer receives a £5 per £100 of liability 
transfer and the higher risk farmer receives £10.Any expected utility model for risk-averse decision 
makers would suggest that subsidizing premiums would encourage farmers both to increase their level 
of production, and possibly increase it into riskier areas. The idea is that as a subsidy decreases, lower 
risk farmers would be less motivated to subscribe to crop insurance and riskier farmers could abandon 
their production (probably from marginal land). By modeling it, we could assume a multi-output firm 
with a fixed amount of land L*that can be allocated between j crops. The producer’s problem is to 
select levels of x variable inputs for each of the j crops in the production plan and to allocate L* 
hectares of land among these j crops. The modeled farmer is a price taker in the output and variable 
input markets. The farmer decides to subscribe an all risk (ARI) crop insurance contract guaranteeing 
yield losses up to 30% of average yield, with the following payoff:{Ij, Mj} = 1, …, I, where Ij 
represents the random (eventual) insurance indemnity and Mj is the non-random insurance premium 
for crop j. Moreover, at sowing time, the farmer could chooses to receive the environmental payments 
(decoupled payments), λ∈ {0, 1}, by comply his crop practice with the CAP’s rules.  We are assuming 
that crop insurance and input decisions are made simultaneously. This requires that the planning 
processes underlying both decisions occur simultaneously, which would appear a logical consequence 
of assuming that farmer decisions are affected by the overall economic environment, i.e. government 
risk management programmes and environmental payments. 
At sowing time, total farm revenue Π is plausibly based on the expectation made on price, yield and 
costs experienced in the previous season, such that: 
E(Π|Ω) = pieyie + cov (pieyie) - ci        [1)] 
Where, 
E(·|Ω)  is an expectation operator conditional on the information set Ω; ejp is the expected price of the 
jth crop; ejy  denotes the expected yield of the jth crop; cov (pjyj) denotes the covariance between price 
and yield andi is expected to be negative (natural hedging mechanism) ; ci is the per hectare cost of 
production. The per hectare revenue for crop j and farmers iwhen crop insurance is subsidised and 
environmental payments will therefore depend on price an yield realizations, input costs, and  the 
environmental payments. If the income per crop is identified as ,jjS pi  where jS  is acreage planted to 
crop j, the total crop income pi is the sum of income over all crops: j
j
jS pipi ∑= .The representative 
farmer maximizes the expected utility of income, choosing the acreage allocation jS , input use jx , 
and participation in both environmental programme ϑ and insurance programme:  
      [2] 
Where, 
( )•F represents the joint distribution function of prices and yields; the farmers’ utility function ( )•u  is 
assumed to be a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. We also assume decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), that is 0/ 22 <∂∂ piU  (Pratt, 1964). The optimal acreage allocation and input use 
for each crop ( jS  and jx  for all j), follows the constraints on acreage allocation 






≥ ∑
j
jSS . 
In this way, as introduced by Seo et al. (2005), the intensive margin effect of the availability of crop 
insurance and disaster payments for a crop could be identified with the difference in the optimal use of 
input jx  when the programme is available versus when it is not. Similarly, the extensive margin effect 
could be viewed as a change in optimal acreage jS  when the same programmes are available. 
A simple model of input and land allocation 
Following Lambert and McCarl (1985), using a negative-exponential (DARA) utility function for the 
empirical analysis, we develop a solvable expected utility maximization model which is (a) free of 
restrictions on the forms of the utility function, and (b) free of assumptions regarding the distribution 
of the uncertain parameters. The underlying assumption in the model implies that wealth effects could 
affect production decisions. 
With negative exponential utility ( ( ) ( )cc θν −−= exp ), the objective function for problem (3) is:  
( )[ ]∑ −−
k
kRpiexp1           [3] 
Where, 
k indexes each state (Monte Carlo random drawn), R is the coefficient of risk aversion, and 
jk
j
jk S pipi ∑=  is profit associated to the state k. The coefficient of risk aversion is the ratio of the 
second and first derivatives of the utility function. The values for R used here are consistent with 
previous studies on the effects of the public subsidy at premium (Capitanio and Adinolfi, 2009; 
Capitanio et al., 2014). In particular we have set R=1 in order to assume low risk-aversion, and R=3 
for high risk-aversion. Income from crop j in state k is:  
piijk= pk’y’k(xj) – cj – r’xj + ϑEPjk + ∑i(Iijk – Mijk)       [4] 
Where, the subscript k is for variables assumed to be random  (e.g. prices, yields, environmental, 
insurance indemnities and disaster payments).  
Given that we set the model at only one trigger level, the non-random insurance premium for each 
crop does not depend, unlike in Seo et al. (2005), on several coverage levels. This makes it easier to 
calculate the expected net indemnity which is equal to the expected indemnity minus the actual 
premium and better represents the Italian crop insurance market. Since the integration required to 
obtain the expected indemnity is analytically intractable for the model, we used Monte Carlo 
integration. In agriculture, simulation models are routinely applied to biological system analysis (e.g., 
crop simulation or environmental models) and there is always some uncertainty present in the system, 
which can be modeled by sampling from appropriate probability distributions. 
Following Greene (2000), we interpret the integral as an expected value. The expected indemnity is 
the average indemnity for each policy over all states. Since crop yields are known to fall in a range 
from 0 to some maximum possible value and their distribution can be significantly skewed either to 
the right or to the left and the beta distribution has such flexibility, we introduced into our analysis a 
random crop yield which follows a beta distribution, with mean and variance that depend on the 
dosage of applied nitrogen fertilizer. The model was solved using the non-linear program solver in 
GAMS using the method suggested by Richardson and Condra (1981). 
Results 
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. With regard to the optimal fertilizer use and acreage 
allocation when the subsidized insurance program is available, unsurprisingly, our results show that 
crop insurance generally has a positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both wheat and 
tomato. Depending on the crop and the farmer’s level of risk aversion, the optimal rate increases by 
about 5 q/ha. Crop insurance has a large effect on the optimal acreage allocation. When ARI is 
available, optimal tomato acreage almost doubles, accompanied by an appropriate decrease in wheat 
area. Table 2 also shows that as farmer risk aversion increases, the optimal nitrogen rate decreases for 
all alternatives regardless of the crop type because nitrogen is used as a risk-increasing input. In 
addition, optimal tomato area decreases and optimal wheat area increases, because tomato is the riskier 
crop. For the range of risk aversion levels explored, the optimal insurance coverage level slightly 
changed for tomato, but increased for wheat. 
In our study, crop insurance positively affected both crops at the intensive margin. It would be 
inappropriate to compare our results with others in the past due to the different areas investigated. 
Regardless of yield distribution, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it optimal to bear more 
risk and so choose fertilizer rates accordingly. Given our conditional yield distributions, this means an 
increase in the fertilizer rate. Since our analysis was conducted for a unique scenario, it would be 
prudent to avoid direct comparisons to other studies carried out previously. 
Concluding remarks 
The environmental impact of farming continues to play a significant role in policy debates regarding 
the role of government in the agricultural sector of the economy. It has been argued that government 
policies that reduce the production risk facing a producer may incentivize activities harmful for the 
environment. For example, the provision of state-subsidised crop insurance may encourage producers 
to bring economically marginal land into production. If that land is also more environmentally fragile 
than land already farmed, this reduction in risk provided by state-subsidised crop insurance could lead 
to a reduction in environmental quality. In addition to crop insurance, the government has set up a 
myriad of other programmes designed, among other things, to provide income support and reduce 
income variability in the agricultural sector. Some of these programme payments are linked to the 
current production of a particular crop, while other programme payments are decoupled from current 
production. 
While such programmes provide incentives to expand production on the extensive margin, they may 
also lead to reductions in environmental amenity and prejudice multifunctionality objectives. In 
addition to encouraging production on environmentally fragile land, farm subsidies and risk 
management policies provide incentives for producers to alter their crop mix, cropping practices 
(including input use) and conservation practices. 
Although cautiously waiting for further empirical or theoretical evidence may be probably wiser, it 
seems clear so far that insurance subsidies have the potential to alter land use, cropping practices and 
conservation practices, and may contribute to increased soil erosion. Moreover, it would seem that 
subsidising premiums could offset the benefits of environmental programmes, as foreseen by the 
Fischler CAP reform of the European agricultural support system. Government risk management 
programmes undoubtedly introduce potential distortion into farm-level decision-making which affect 
either input and land use. Southern European regions, which are greatly affected by regional 
development policy, maybe affected by these negative externalities. 
A few caveats limit the present analysis. Firstly, the theoretical model we have implemented assumes 
that crop acreage is fixed, and that allocation is feasible only for two different crop types. The model 
predictions are also limited to a partial equilibrium framework. Modelling environmental externalities 
of crop insurance subsidies is challenging and beyond the scope of this paper. Secondly, having 
assumed that the region is homogeneous we are only partially able to disentangle changes due to 
extensive or intensive margins. This issue is also a topic for future research. 
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Table 1 Crop insurance market in Italy (2005-2012) 
Descriptor Unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Certificates n° (000) 212 211 236 264 226 208 207 214 
Insured quantities Mln t 14.8 14.8 16.3 20.4 18.2 20.1 19.8 na 
Insured hectares 000 ha 1074 1125 1051 1450 1355 1153 1164 na 
Insured Value Mln € 3,810 3,789 4,379 5,436 5,131 5,312 6,145 6,826 
Total Premiums collected  (TP) Mln € 269 265 292 338 317 285 287 321 
Indemnities (VR) Mln € 159 149 184 272 234 169 171 231 
Public Contribution * % 65.90 66.62 66.78 66.34 67 66.41 66.12 na 
Average tariffs % 7.4 7.5 7.22 6.75 6.70 5.78 5.74 na 
VR/TP % 59.6 55.4 64 81 75 60 58 71.9 
(*)premiums/insured value 
Source: Ismea (2011, 2013) 
 
 
Table 2 Intensive margin – Estimated change (%) in nitrogen fertilizer use. 
 Risk-neutral farmers Risk-averse farmers 
 Tomato Wheat Tomato Wheat 
Scenario  
EP only Baseline -42.1% -43.1% -2.9% 
ARI and EP  +4.2% +6.7% +6.7% +4.3% 
     
ARI and EP indicate, respectively, all risk insurance and environmental programs. 
 
 
Table 3 Extensive margin changes – Estimated change (%) in cropped area allocation. 
 Risk-neutral farmers Risk-averse farmers 
 Tomato Wheat Tomato Wheat 
Scenario  
EP only Baseline 147.4% 218.1% -21.2% 
ARI and EP  +50.5% -13.8% -8.8% +62.8% 
 
 
